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A. INTRODUCTION 
In Europe, religion continues to exercise a significant, albeit variable influence over the 
conformation of national identities.1 Therefore, European states have adopted a panoply of 
institutional arrangements, ranging from the official recognition of religion to official 
secularism, in order to reflect the relevance of religion in their particular identity.2  The 
display of Christian religious symbols in state schools is a common means of affirming the 
role played by religion within the polity. However, this practice has become exceptionally 
contested out of concern for the protection of the religious freedom of students and of the 
parental right to raise their children in conformity with their own religious convictions, in 
accordance with Article 9 and Article 2 of Protocol 1 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights. 
 Most recently, the permanent display of the crucifix in the classrooms of Italian state 
schools was brought under scrutiny before two chambers of the European Court of Human 
Rights. In 2011, the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR issued its landmark ruling in the case of 
Lautsi v Italy.3 It held that the display of the crucifix did not amount to a violation of the 
religious freedoms of the applicants, owing to the margin of appreciation afforded to the 
states in the exercise of their educational functions. This decision overturned the judgment of 
the Court’s Second Chamber. Lautsi generated a clamorous public debate, garnering both 
strong support and tough detraction. It has also been the subject of extensive critical 
commentary for different reasons. One common criticism focuses on the adequacy of the 
decision in light of the Court’s institutional position as an international tribunal. Another line 
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of criticism is characterised by principled arguments intended to elucidate the intricacy of the 
interpretive concepts underlying the issues presented to the Court.4 
These analyses, however, overlook the exceptional noteworthiness of the lesson to be drawn 
from this case: namely, that litigation before the ECtHR alleging violations of the religious 
freedoms recognised by the Convention, as interpreted repeatedly by the ECtHR itself, is an 
ineffectual means of challenging the “non-coercive” symbolic nexus between religion and the 
state. The common criticisms highlighted above are to a great extent misplaced, because one 
can reasonably conclude that the Court has interpreted the religious freedoms recognised by 
the Convention adequately. The unease with the symbolic endorsement of religion by the 
state, however, points to the need to rethink the current situation in Europe through novel 
arguments that go beyond the protection of the religious freedoms afforded by the 
Convention. It requires a more profound engagement with the political commitments that 
culturally diverse states must subscribe to in order to develop and maintain stable and 
prosperous societies. 
 In order to fully comprehend the unfair implications arising from the endorsement of 
religious symbols by the state one must scrutinise the way in which “the state’s symbolic acts 
and speech affect the status of citizenship, as they enhance or diminish the sense of self-
respect that citizens derive from being able to identify with their political institutions”.5 This 
theoretical framework, characterised by Cécile Laborde as a “republican liberal political” 
viewpoint, questions the moral legitimacy of the symbolic endorsement of religion by the 
state because it affects the standing of individuals within the political community, either in 
their benefit or to their detriment, in a manner inconsistent with a rich conception of 
citizenship that is concerned with the civic status and the recognition afforded to all the 
members of a democratic society on equal terms.6 This approach places the onus on states to 
rethink their relations with religion as a means of affirming their commitment to political 
equality, in the face of increasing diversity across the continent. 
 This argument is illustrated through three main sections. The first section presents an 
overview of the decisions handed down in Lautsi by the Chamber and the Grand Chamber of 
the ECtHR. The second section analyses the religious jurisprudence of the ECtHR and 
contends that the Grand Chamber correctly applied it to the case at hand. The third section 
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will explore the political relevance of a state’s symbolic nexus with religion. It explains why 
appearances matter from the viewpoint of a rich conception of citizenship. 
 
B. THE CASE OF LAUTSI v ITALY 
The case of Lautsi arose from a complaint launched by a parent against the permanent display 
of the crucifix in every classroom of an Italian state school attended by her children. She 
argued that the display of this religious symbol was contrary to the principle of secularism 
that she sought to inculcate in her children. The mother challenged the school’s refusal to 
remove the crucifix before the national courts. However, an administrative court and the 
Italian State Council dismissed her complaint, arguing, in general, that the presence of the 
crucifix in the classroom did not violate her rights or the rights of her children, since it must 
be viewed as a symbol of Italian history, culture and identity.7 The matter was then brought 
before the Second Chamber of the ECtHR. The applicant alleged that the display of the 
crucifix constituted an interference with her right to ensure that her children receive an 
education in conformity with her religious and philosophical convictions under Article 2 of 
Protocol 1 of the Convention, as well as a violation of the right to freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion of herself and her children, recognised by Article 9 of the 
Convention. In its unanimous judgment, the Chamber ruled in favour of the applicants. It 
reasoned that the crucifix was a “powerful external symbol” with a predominantly religious 
meaning that could be emotionally disturbing for children belonging to religious minorities.8 
It further stated that the state has a duty to uphold confessional neutrality in public 
education.9 Therefore, the Chamber concluded that “the compulsory display of a symbol of a 
particular faith in the exercise of public authority […] restricts the right of parents to educate 
their children in conformity with their convictions and the right of schoolchildren to believe 
or not believe”.10 
 In accordance with Article 43 of the Convention, the Italian government requested 
that the case be referred to the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR. A panel of the Grand Chamber 
granted the request and, in light of its particular significance, the Grand Chamber 
subsequently granted leave to intervene in the process to a number of actors, including 
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members of the European Parliament, non-governmental organisations, and several states.11 
The Grand Chamber overturned the unanimous decision of the Second Chamber by a 
supermajority. By 15 votes to 2, the Grand Chamber held that there had been no violation of 
the rights of the applicants given the margin of appreciation enjoyed by the states “in their 
efforts to reconcile exercise of the functions they assume in relation to education and teaching 
with respect for the right of parents to ensure such education and teaching in conformity with 
their own religious and philosophical convictions”.12 This margin extends to the place they 
accord to religion within the school environment, as long as it does not amount to 
indoctrination.13  
 The Grand Chamber acknowledged that the margin afforded to the states on this 
matter is determined in part by the fact that “there is no European consensus on the question 
of the presence of religious symbols in state schools”.14 It further contended that, although the 
display of the crucifix does bestow preponderant visibility upon the religion of the majority, 
this does not amount to indoctrination, since the crucifix is essentially a “passive symbol”, 
unlikely to have any influence on the students.15  Furthermore, the Grand Chamber lent 
relevance to the fact that the presence of the crucifix is not accompanied by any compulsory 
religious education and that state schools in Italy are open to students of all religions on equal 
terms.16 
 
C. LAUTSI AND THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE ECTHR 
A fair analysis of the jurisprudence of the ECtHR, including Lautsi, must recognise the 
daunting task faced by this court when adjudicating cases concerning religious matters, in 
light of the manifold relationships that exist among states and religions in Europe, where the 
absence of neutrality in church-state relations remains the norm.17 The minimum common 
denominator unifying the European landscape is some form of national recognition of a right 
to religious freedom, reinforced by Article 9 and Article 2 of Protocol 1 of the Convention.18 
This, of course, should not be construed as exempting the Court’s judgments on this issue 
from critical scrutiny. However, acknowledging this state of affairs from the outset highlights 
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the rarity of secular institutional arrangements, particularly notable in France and Turkey, and 
the formidable interference in the national sphere that the Court would have to undertake in 
order to lead Europe in that direction. An accurate portrayal of the current situation in most 
European states is offered by Laborde’s ideal-type model of “modest establishment”.19 Under 
this model, religious freedoms are afforded adequate protection, with the state officially 
supporting or recognising one or several religions. 20  This points to the fact that, while 
religions have lost some of their substantive influence in the areas of law and politics, they 
have nevertheless retained a privileged position in the cultural domain.21  In this regard, 
Europe is unique when compared to the rest of the world.22  Therefore, the Court must 
conciliate the liberal principles that underlie the fundamental values of the Convention with 
the communal rationales that underpin the particular institutional arrangements chosen by the 
states.23 
 The jurisprudence of the ECtHR on this matter, as synthesised by Ronan McCrea, has 
“granted priority to the right of states to define their own relationship with religion [and to] 
promote certain denominations through state institutions”.24 State recognition or support of 
religion, however, is not without limits. In the case of Refah Partisi v Turkey, the Court 
clearly emphasised the role of the state as “the neutral and impartial organiser of the exercise 
of various religions, faiths and beliefs”.25 In order to fulfil this role, the state must refrain 
from assessing the “legitimacy of religious beliefs”.26 This means it must remain impartial 
regarding the “truth claims” of religious doctrines. The exercise of the state’s public function 
in the educational context is a particularly sensitive issue. Children can be particularly prone 
to processing information acritically, making them especially vulnerable to religious 
proselytism.27 The ECtHR acknowledged this point in the case of Dahlab v Switzerland.28 
Therefore, when discharging its educational responsibilities, the state must ensure that the 
knowledge imparted to the students is relayed in an “objective, critical and pluralistic 
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manner”.29 In other words, the state must not pursue indoctrination.30 Finally, the obligations 
of the state regarding education are not limited to the curriculum, but also extend to the 
organisation of the school environment.31 
 This brief account of the relevant precedents of the ECtHR and of the current situation 
in Europe is meant to show that the Grand Chamber did not depart from its previous rulings 
in the case of Lautsi. On the contrary, it highlights the Court’s “pragmatic acceptance of the 
continued importance of religion to Member State identity and [its unwillingness] to interpret 
guarantees of religious freedom in such a way as to interfere with the ability of Member 
States to define a relationship with religion which reflects their own cultural norms”.32 This 
acceptance of religion’s cultural role has consistently led the Court to allow the state to 
symbolically attach itself to religion.33  
 Lautsi, of course, is not without inauspicious weaknesses. The cursory 
characterisation of the crucifix as a “passive symbol”, for instance, may be perceived, given 
the Court’s previous designation of the Islamic headscarf as a “powerful external symbol” in 
Dahlab, as applying a double standard that unduly distinguishes ‘welcome’ from 
‘unwelcome’ religious beliefs, and treats the latter in a discriminatory manner. 34  This 
unfortunate distinction, however, should not detract attention from the fact that the ratio 
decidendi in both cases relied specifically on the margin of appreciation afforded to the states 
regarding the nexus that they decide to have with religion.35 In this respect, it is important to 
note that the Grand Chamber did not endorse the crucifix: it merely ruled that its presence did 
not interfere with the religious freedoms of the applicants. This points to the fact that the 
religious freedoms protected by the Convention are not violated by the symbolic attachment 
of the state to religion, as long as this nexus is “non-coercive”: i.e. “it does not stop anyone 
from practicing his or her religion or from living a fully secular life”.36 Therefore, in order to 
reasonably expound the misgivings surrounding the symbolic endorsement of religion, it is 
necessary to suggest an analysis that goes beyond the recurrent resort to the religious 
freedoms of the Convention and the subsequent recourse to litigation before the ECtHR. 
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D. WHY APPEARANCES MATTER: THE PROBLEM WITH THE SYMBOLIC 
ENDORSEMENT OF RELIGION BY THE STATE 
Lautsi has attracted a considerable amount of criticism focusing on different aspects of the 
ruling. A first group of arguments disapproves or commends the judgment in light of the 
Court’s institutional position. Joseph Weiler, for instance, praises the wisdom of the Grand 
Chamber’s decision for its refusal to “short circuit the political and the constitutional 
adjudicative process in Italy”.37 Lorenzo Zucca, on the other hand, argues that the Court’s 
judgment gave Italy too much leeway regarding the flimsy legal basis presented to support 
the mandate of the crucifix, instead of forcing it to revise its legislation in order to promote a 
legislative (and perhaps judicial) debate on the matter at the national level.38 Another group 
of arguments criticises the ruling for its failure to uphold certain values, such as secularism 
and neutrality. Susanna Mancini, for example, observes that state endorsement of religious 
symbols in state schools “[challenges] the very legitimacy of the dominant conception of 
constitutionalism and its nexus to the principle of secularism”.39 This argument should be 
understood in light of Habermas’ contention that “[t]he self-understanding of the 
constitutional state has developed within the framework of a contractualist tradition that relies 
on ‘natural reason’, in other words solely on public arguments to which all persons are 
supposed to have equal access”.40 However, as András Sajó rightly notes: “most democracies 
are without a strong normative theory or practice of constitutional secularism”.41  Hence, 
political commitment to secularism, understood as “an overarching principle of the 
constitutional state”, remains an aspiration.42  
 While acknowledging the import of all of these assessments, a further possibility of 
examination has been overlooked by most of these analyses: one that goes beyond the 
Rawlsian distribution of basic rights, to include more “intangible forms of social 
recognition”. 43  In line with the Grand Chamber’s decision in Lautsi, the display of the 
crucifix in the classroom can be perceived as a non-coercive endorsement of religion on 
behalf of the state. Individuals are free to exercise their religious freedoms under the 
particular arrangements set up by the state, as long as they fall within the margin of 
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appreciation allowed by the ECtHR. The role of religion is therefore contained within the 
cultural domain and, as previously suggested, no violation of Article 9 and Article 2 of 
Protocol 1 of the Convention is to be found in this case. The symbolic endorsement of 
religion, however, can be said to have an impact that surpasses the scope of protection 
afforded by the Convention: the presence of the crucifix in the classroom carries with it an 
expressive function about what that particular community stands for. 
 This idea was first expounded by Justice O’Connor of the Supreme Court of the 
United States, a nation with a long history of “modest establishment”,44 to use Laborde’s 
terms, stemming from the first Amendment of the American Constitution. In her concurrent 
opinion in Lynch v Donnelly, Justice O’Connor argued that religious endorsement by the state 
“sends a message to non adherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the political 
community, and an accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favoured 
members of the political community”. 45  Or as Laborde rightly asserts: “[symbolic 
endorsement of religion] sends a message that some are not full members of the political 
community, that they cannot enter the public square on equal terms with others, and this will 
make it difficult for them fully to identify with their political institutions”.46 The permanent 
display of the crucifix in every classroom of Italian state schools can therefore be interpreted 
as having the effect of making religious affiliation relevant to the individual’s standing in the 
political community. 47  This is particularly true in contexts where, as in Italy, the 
overwhelming majority of the population belongs (at least in nominative terms) to one 
particular religion and, as acknowledged by the Italian tribunals in this case, the symbols of 
that religion are thought to be a strong component of national identity. 
 A healthy democratic society requires a strong collective identity.48 This can only be 
achieved through solidarity among citizens of all creeds.49 This identity, however, must be 
made compatible with the plurality of viewpoints and comprehensive doctrines that are 
deemed to exist in an increasingly diverse society. In this sense, “democracy obliges us to 
show much more solidarity and much more commitment to one another in our joint political 
project than was demanded by the hierarchical and authoritarian societies of yesteryear”.50 In 
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other words, the political institutions that serve as a forum for public deliberation should not 
alienate a significant number of their own citizens by promoting a particular worldview. In 
the case of Lautsi, the Italian authorities that intervened in the matter did precisely that: they 
partially credited the Catholic religion with the development of the values of democracy and 
tolerance. This however, as Ronald Dworkin notes, is paradoxical:  
“We believe that religious tolerance is among the most basic of human rights, and we 
therefore think that it violates people’s rights to force upon them religious doctrines 
and practices that they do not accept. But is it not exactly what we do when our 
invading armies march under a banner of religious rhetoric?”51 
 The unfair implications of the symbolic endorsement of religion in the public sphere, 
when it is associated with the exercise of a public function, such as education, are therefore 
not eliminated, even when the influence of religion is contained within the cultural domain. 
The consensus of a previously homogeneous society regarding the role played by religion in 
the community needs to be rethought because, even when distinguishing the “truth claims” 
from the cultural role of religion, a degree of inequality remains.52 Although most European 
states continue to recognise or support the Christian religious denominations that have 
historically shaped their own identity, their commitment to political equality suggests a need 
to clarify and rethink the “unarticulated shared cultural norms which are breaking down as 
Europe becomes more culturally and religiously diverse”.53 In other words, a preoccupation 
with the rights of the states to develop and maintain their own culture should not outweigh 
the fundamental right to treatment as equals of all individuals that all liberal democracies are 
compelled to uphold. In this sense, a reminder of the Enlightenment’s central achievement is 
necessary: “getting our fellow citizens to rely less on tradition, and to be more willing to 
experiment with new customs and institutions”.54 
 In the words of Gabriel and Liviu Andreescu: “[a] lay public sphere is the only 
solution to ensuring genuine equality between members of majority and minority churches, 
agnostics, atheists, or non-theists. In the long term, this is the only way to eliminate religious 
(and anti-religious) tensions”.55 Unlike cases such as Eweida and others v UK56, where the 
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symbolic attachment of an individual to religion can affect members of the majority and of 
minorities alike, cases like Lautsi, where the symbolic attachment to religion is exercised by 
the state, can mainly affect members of minorities.57 This should highlight the risk that the 
symbolic endorsement of religion is capable of imposing an inferior status of citizenship on 
members of minorities. It can also have the effect of generating civic divisiveness along 
religious lines, as conceded by the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of 
McCreary v ACLU.58 
 In light of the above, it is clear that the onus lies on states to change their current 
institutional arrangements in order to welcome a diverse population without discrimination in 
the public realm. Achieving the political equality implied by this line of reasoning does not 
have at its disposal a neat pathway to institutional recognition. It requires the help of a series 
of mechanisms that incorporate both legislative deliberation and progressive adjudication. 
What is clear, however, is the need to rely less on the assistance of the ECtHR and the 
religious liberties of the Convention. Lautsi clearly illustrates the limitations of this 
ineffective approach. The profound political implications for the identity of the state that 
underlie this case reflect the need for a widespread public debate that takes into account the 
social diversification of Europe and seriously engages with the changes required to recognise 
and accommodate this diversity. This will not prove to be an easy task because, as Charles 
Taylor has pointed out, “contemporary democracies, as they progressively diversify, will 
have to undergo redefinitions of their historical identities, which may be far-reaching and 
painful.”59 However, a commitment to the values that should guide every liberal democracy 
indicates that it is a price worth paying. 
 
E. CONCLUSION 
The need to develop a better understanding of secular thought and secular practice is 
tantamount to making this idea appealing. As long as there is a fundamental 
misunderstanding as to what it requires, the possibility of spreading this idea across Europe 
seems grim. The divergence of institutional arrangements regarding religion in Europe has 
made it impossible for the ECtHR to adhere to an interpretation of religious freedoms 
imposing strict neutrality on states. It has therefore interpreted the duty of states in this matter 
to be consistent with a margin of appreciation when discharging their public authority in the 
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educational context. In the case of Lautsi, this meant leaving the decision of whether or not to 
continue displaying the crucifix in the classrooms of state schools to the Italian authorities. 
 However, even if the Court found that there is no violation of the religious liberties 
protected by the Convention arising from the symbolic endorsement of religion by the state, 
an alternate account of the unjust implications of this practice is possible by relying on a 
conception of citizenship that is concerned with the recognition of every individual on equal 
terms. Particularly given the increasing diversity that most European societies are 
experiencing, states should direct their attention to the issues arising from the lack of political 
equality. They should be concerned with the political community’s ability to develop healthy 
democratic practices and the changes that they must make to their traditions in order to make 
this possible. 
